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INSURANCE
Insurance litigation was again prolific (25 cases in the state
supreme court and the federal courts) and moderately signifi-
cant in South Carolina during the survey period. Though there
were few cases of extreme importance, reversing precedents or
striking bold new directions, a meaningful proportion of the cases
did deal with situations which had never before come to a court
for a construction of prevailing South Carolina law.
A. Fnm IsrANcFO
Identity of the Insured. Along the miles of beaches that com-
pose South Carolina's justly famous "Grand Strand," innumer-
able motels blink their neon presence into the seaside twilight,
groping for the ever-abundant tourist dollar. One of these
motels, located at Horry County's Cherry Grove Beach and
known commonly enough as the Ocean View Motel, spawned an
interesting question in Williams v. South Carolina Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Co.1
The motel was owned by Charlie Williams and M. D. Robin-
son, but they had leased it to Mack Hamilton for the beach
season of 1966 and made the same arrangement for 1967. Hamil-
ton's lease, along with an option to purchase the property, ran
from April 15, 1967 through November 15 of that year, but the
owners allowed Hamilton to go into possession of the property
several months before the lease commenced in order to begin
painting and making repairs. The owners not having fire insur-
ance on the motel, Hamilton got in touch with the defendant's
local agent2 to buy a policy. The contract, effective as of Decem-
ber 12, 1966, listed the insured as "Ocean View Motel % Mack
A. Hamilton, Jr." and listed Williams as a mortgagee of the
property, rather than part owner. When a torrid Valentine's Day
blaze destroyed the motel two months later, Williams and Robin-
son sued on the policy. Though the policy named the insured as
"Ocean View Motel", apparently there was no such legal entity.3
1. 251 S.C. 464, 163 S.E2d 212 (1968).
2. The court noted that the agent was "relatively new and inexperienced."
Id. at 467, 163 S.E.2d at 213.
3. The caption of the case names the plaintiffs Williams and Robinson, and
then says "d/b/a Ocean View Motel", but the complaint did not allege and
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Thus the policy did not contain any named insured, and the ques-
tion arose, whom did the insurer intend to insure?
The defendant complained that the policy was issued upon re-
liance on misrepresentations of fact as to the ownership and the
insurable interest. But the plaintiffs alleged that the insurer
through its agent had knowledge of the lease and option agree-
ment, and thus had waived any defect as to the name stated in the
policy. Hamilton, who was named as a defendant in the action,
asserted in his answer that the insurer had full knowledge of the
true interests of all the parties, and he cross-complained against
the insurer, asserting that he was entitled to protection under the
policy. The trial court found for the plaintiffs, and the insurer
appealed from the trial judge's denial of its motions for judg-
ment non obstante veredicto and for a new trial.
The supreme court found authority4 for the proposition that it
is not essential to the effectiveness of a policy that the name of the
insured appear, if the insurance company was not misled as to
the identity of the applicant. There was obvious conflict in the
evidence as to whether the insurer through its agent had full
knowledge of the status of the property with respect to its title
and the interests of the various parties. Since a new trial was go-
ing to be necessary," the court did not discuss the evidence fur-
ther, save to note that it raised jury questions as to whether the
insurer intended to issue the policy for plaintiffs' benefit, and as
to whether Hamilton made false representations. Thus the trial
judge made no error in refusing to direct a verdict for the in-
surer."
4. 29 Am. JuR. Insurance § 240 (1960) (cited at 163 S.E2d 214). 43 Am.
JuR. 2d Insurance § 252 (1969) is to the same effect.
5. The court reversed the case on grounds other than the insurance issue.
The insurer's motion for a non-suit as to Hamilton's cross complaint had been
granted at the trial on the ground that Hamilton had no insurable interest
Hamilton was, from that moment on, no longer a real party in the case, but
plaintiffs' attorney continued to cross-examine him as if he were still a de-
fendant. The court ruled this reversible error.
6. During his closing argument to the jury, plaintiffs' attorney apparently
made a prejudicial statement about insurance companies. The brief for plain-
tiffs-respondents denied that the argument went as appellent restated it, com-
plaining that some statements were repeated out of context. Plaintiffs' attorney,
obviously a well-versed layman of the cloth, noted:
By using words and phrases out of context a different and distorted
meaning from that intended can be conveyed. By way of example
it can be made to appear that there is in the Bible an admonition to
commit suicide. Matthew 27:5 "... and [Judas] went away and
hanged himself." Luke 10:37: . . . and Jesus said unto him, go,
and do thou likewise."
Brief for Respondents at 12. The supreme court ruled that if plaintiffs' counsel
really said what defendant's counsel said he said, the court should have
reprimanded counsel and instructed the jury to disregard the argument.
[Vol. 21
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Insurable interest. The issue of insurable interest was raised in
Reid v. Hardware Mutual Insurance Co.,7 involving the interest
retained by a mortgagor who conveys the mortgaged premises but
remains liable on the debt secured by the mortgage. Reid, owner-
occupier of the one-family dwelling involved, had bought a fire
insurance policy in 1964. The next year, Reid sold the house to
Toldison, who assumed the mortgage, butt Reid was still personal-
ly liable on the note which the mortgage covered. When fire de-
stroyed the residence late in 1965, both Reid and Tollison sued on
the policy. The trial court held that Tollison was not covered by
the policy" because of failure to notify the insurer of the change
in ownership. But the insurer was held liable to Reid in the
amount of the balance of the mortgage debt owed by her at the
time of the fire. In affirming the lower court, the supreme court
held that Reid continued to have an insurable interest: "The in-
surable interest that a mortgagor has in real property is not de-
feated by a voluntary sale and conveyance of the premises as long
as he is personally liable for the payment of the mortgage debt."19
Vacancy Provision. A not infrequent provision in fire insur-
ance policies provides that coverage on the insured premises will
be suspended "while a described building whether intended for
occupancy by owner or tenant is vacant or unoccupied beyond a
period of sixty consecutive days." This precise exclusionary
clause came before the court for interpretation in Rainwater V.
Maryland Casualty Co.1°1 The plaintiff was involved with several
service stations, some of which were owner-operated and some of
which were leased. The particular store involved in this case
ceased to operate as a service station-truck stop on September 20,
1965, when the tenant left. On December 12 of that year, the
building was destroyed by fire. The insurers denied liability,
contending that the premises had been either vacant or unoc-
7. 166 S.E2d 317 (S.C. 1969).
8. At the time of the conveyance, the policy was not transferred by Reid to
Tollison.
9. 166 S.E2d at 319. Apparently this is the first time this precise holding
has been made in South Carolina. The court found South Carolina authority
for the general proposition that anyone has an insurable interest in property
who derives a benefit from its existence or would suffer loss from its destruc-
tion. Crook v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 175 S.C. 42, 178 S.E. 254 (1935). But
no case from this jurisdiction is cited for the proposition that a mortgagor who
has sold the premises, being still liable for the mortgage debt, has an insurable
interest in the property. The court relied primarily on Baughman v. Niagara
Fire Ins. Co., 163 Minn. 300, 204 N.W. 321 (1925). Another aspect of Reid
is discussed infra at 587.
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cupied within the meaning of the exclusionary clause for over
sixty days.
The supreme court, in affirming the trial court's decision for
the plaintiff,"' considered the following facts pertinent: though
the building had ceased to operate as a service station-truck stop,
various items of equipment, tools and merchandise related to the
use of the premises remained there; the building remained
equipped and ready for use and was in fact used by the plaintiff
and his employees on numerous occasions; though the building
was not open to the public, the plaintiff was "surveying the situa-
tion" to decide whether to lease the building again or open it him-
self, and in this connection was frequently on the premises.
The insurers, while practically conceding that the building was
not vacant, grounded their defense on the argument that the
premises were unoccupied. Though the argument is not precise-
ly stated thus, the insurers seemed to be contending in effect that
the station had to be open to the public to be occupied within the
meaning of the policy. The court, lacking South Carolina prece-
dent for the interpretation of the clause,' 2 found ample authority
from other jurisdictions that "vacancy" implies entire abandon-
ment, as distinguished from the temporary cessation of custo-
mary use. "Unoccupied", a term distinct from "vacant", means
lack of habitual human presence. Applying these definitions to
the facts, the court had no trouble in finding as a matter of law
that the building was neither vacant nor unoccupied.
The insurers' best argument was that the description of the
premises in the policies, "the two story brick and CB building
with standard roof occupied as a gas service station,"1 3 was a con-
dition suspending coverage when it was no longer so occupied.
But the court held that the phrase "occupied as a gas service sta-
tion" was for identification purposes only and did not prescribe
a condition of coverage. Similarly, though endorsements attached
to the policies included the words "occupied for Retail Automo-
bile Filling Station purposes only," the court ruled that the oc-
11. The supreme court merely rendered a four-paragraph per curiam opinion,
adopting and repeating part of Judge Baker's trial court order.
12. Apparently this is the first time "vacant" and "unoccupied" have come
before the South Carolina court in such a context. Judge Baker cites no South
Carolina authorities in his order. WEST'S SouTH CAROIjNA DIGEST Words
and Phrases has no citation under "unoccupied" and the only cases listed under
"vacant" or "vacancy" have to do with the absence of an officeholder from
a political position.
13. 166 S.E.2d 546, 548.
[Vol. 21
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cupancy referred to here was in the sense of "holding or keeping
for use," and not in the absolute construction of "using or making
use of." Such descriptions of the building were not sufficient for
the insurers to avoid liability by alleging failure to occupy for a
specific purpose.14
Warranties - A Promise For Now. A warranty, which in in-
surance law is a statement, description or undertaking on the part
of the insured in the policy relating contractually to the risk in-
sured against, is generally one of two kinds--"affirmative",
which asserts the existence of a fact or condition and appears on
the face of the policy, or "promissory", an absolute undertaking
by the insured in the policy that certain facts or conditions per-
taining to the risk shall continue.Y5 In Reid v. Hardware Mutual
Insurance Co., 16 the court held that the policy's description of
the insured dwelling as "owner occupied" was merely an
affirmative warranty by the insured that the dwelling was so
occupied when the policy was entered into, and not a continuing
or promissory warranty that it would so remain.1
Waiver and Estoppel - Ignorance of Fact Is a Good Ewcuse.
In another case involving a vacancy provision,', the plaintiff in
Washington Realty Co. v. American Mutual Fire Insurance (o.19
had lost for purposes of appeal the argument that the buildings
were not vacant,20 and so the appeal was predicated on the asser-
tion that the insurer had waived and was estopped from asserting
the vacancy provision. The insurer-defendant had in 1958 issued
to the realtor-plaintiff a fire policy containing the usual 60-day
vacancy provision. The policy covered two buildings owned by
the plaintiff on Charleston's King Street. In 1962, one of the
14. See Stivers v. National Am. Ins. Co., 247 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1957).
15. 43 Am. JuR. 2d Insurance §§ 744, 745 (1969). Frequent recourse is had
throughout this paper to Volumes 43 and 44 of Am. JuR. 2d for general
statements of insurance law. These volumes are cited because they are the
most recent such references-both were published in 1969-and because
their broad overview of the subject provides an excellent jumping-off point for
a fuller discussion of the principles involved.
16. 166 S.E.2d 317 (S.C. 1969). For a summary of the facts of this case and
the discussion of another issue raised by it, see p. 585 supra.
17. No South Carolina authority is cited for this proposition. For an example
of a promissory warranty, see Evans v. Century Ins. Co., 201 S. C. 273, 22
S.E.2d 877 (1942).
18. See also Rainwater v. Maryland Cas. Co., 166 S.E.2d 546 (S.C. 1969),
discussed supra at 585.
19. 167 S.E.2d 617 (S.C. 1969).
20. The transcript of the trial court record had been prepared by plaintiff's
prior counsel, who did not appeal from any of the trial judge's findings of
fact-one of which was that the buildings were vacant at the time of the fire.
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buildings became vacant. In 1963, the insurer renewed the fire
policy. In 1964, the other building became vacant. A 1966 fire
damaged both buildings, and the insurer denied liability, proper-
ly invoking the vacancy clause.
The plaintiff-appellant contended that the insurer had waived
the vacancy provision because no inquiry was made into the sta-
tus of the buildings when the policy was renewed. Though one
of the buildings was actually vacant at the time of the renewal,
the trial judge, sitting also as finder of fact, found that the in-
surer had no knowledge of such vacancy at that time. The in-
surer, falling back on the maxim that a waiver must be an inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right, contended that since
there was no knowledge of the vacancy, then the doctrine of
waiver could not apply. But the plaintiff pushed a step farther:
Before renewing the Policy five years later, [defend-
ant's] agent... should have inquired, and if he had pur-
sued this diligently, he clearly would have come up with
the knowledge that on June 18, 1963, the clothing store
bad moved out of 422 King Street.21
The insurer's counsel replied:
Apparently the thrust of appellant's argument is that
even though an agent has no knowledge of a vacancy, he
is charged with that knowledge if an actual inspection
would have revealed it. There is no case that we have
found in America that supports this contention . .. .,,
The court agreed with the insurer, stating that the insurer, with-
out knowledge of the vacancy, was under no duty to inquire into
conditions which might later exclude coverage.23
Plaintiff's appeal on the grounds of estoppel arose from these
facts: the property involved was covered by a mortgage, and
upon the issuance of the policy the insurer sent the original policy
to the mortgagee, merely forwarding a "memorandum of insur-
ance" to the plaintiff-owners. The policy itself contained the oc-
cupancy provision, but the memorandum did not. The plaintiff
thus asserted that the insurer's failure to include the occupancy
clause in the memorandum estopped the insurer from relying on
21. Brief for Appellant at 6.
22. Brief for Respondent at 5.
23. Though the respondent's brief claimed there was no American authority
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the defense. Though the question was actually rendered moot by
stipulations in the transcript,24 the court's dictum explained that
since plaintiff's general manager did not read the memorandum
carefully, did not rely on it, and was not misled by the omission
of the occupancy provision, plaintiff had not carried its burden
of proof in asserting the estoppel.
B. LiFEA D AccmEr IwsunAwcE
Public Policy - Life Insurance For A Dead Man. Perhaps the
most controversial case to arise during the survey period was
Dixon v. Wester Union Assurance Co.,25 which presented a
rather bizarre factual situation. Sometime during the first two
weeks of February, 1966, Western Union sent the Dixons, parents
of a serviceman stationed in Vietnam, a letter soliciting their
purchase of a life insurance policy on their son. "If your boy is,
now, to the best of your knowledge in good health, he will be
permanently insured in war and peace .. .", the letter said, and it
further stated, "The policy will then be in force as of the date
your envelope containing your premium is postmarked." 2  The
Dixons decided to buy the insurance, and completed Western
Union's "Ownership Certificate", which was in effect an applica-
tion for insurance and was to be returned to the insurer with the
first premium. The document said,
Upon the first premium being mailed [the insurer] re-
cognizes you as the owner and beneficiary of this policy
.... To the best of your knowledge the insured service-
man is in good health.... The policy will then be in
force as of the date your premium is postmarked.
27
The Dixons thus completed the ownership certificate and mailed
it with a money order for the first premium. The envelope was
postmarked, "Hartsville, S.C., February 14,... PM., 1966." On
February 14, 1966, at 12:00 noon Vietnam time or 1:00 a.m. East-
ern Standard Time, the Dixons' son was killed in action. The
parents were notified the next day.
The policy itself contained the following pertinent para-
graphs:
24. "This issue is precluded by the unchallenged factual findings of the
trial judge that no prejudice resulted to plaintiff from anything in the memoran-
dum." 167 S.E.2d 617, 619 (S.C. 1969); see Record at 22. See also note 20
supra.
25. 251 S.C. 511, 164 S.E.2d 214 (1968).
26. Id. at 515, 164 S.E2d at 216. The court quotes the entire letter of
solicitation.
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This policy shall take effect on the date the applica-
tion is mailed; provided, that unless such premium is re-
ceived at the home office of the company while the in-
sured is alive and in sound health, the liability of the
company hereunder shall be limited to the return of any
premiums paid hereon.
4. Contract [-] This Instrument (referred to herein
as the policy) and the In Force Certificate shall consti-
tute the entire contract of insurance between the parties
hereto. All statements made by or on behalf of the in-
sured shall, in the absence of fraud, be deemed represen-
tations not warranties .... The company shall not be
bound by any promise or representation heretofore or
hereafter made by or to any agent or person other than
the persons above enumerated. 28
One other significant document was the "In Force Certificate",
mailed by the insurer to the Dixons on February 17. It showed
the date of the policy's issue to be February 14, and said, "This
certificate confirms the In Force Date of your policy, which is
the postmarked date of the original application. This certificate
is to be attached to and made part of your policy.329
The Dixons filed their proof of loss; Western Union disclaimed
liability. The outcome of the resulting suit, of course, depended
on the resolution of the conflicting documents involved. The
plaintiffs attacked head-on the policy's provision as to liability
being effected only if the premium was received while the insured
was alive. They contended that this provision was inconsistent
with the letter of solicitation, which they asserted should be a
part of the policy, and with the In Force Certificate, and should
therefore be stricken.
Western Union asserted as a defense that the policy was issued
without the insured's knowledge or consent, and therefore it
should be declared void as a matter of public policy.30 Said
28. Id. at 516, 164 S.E.2d 216-17.
29. Id. at 517, 164 S.E.2d at 217.
30. The public policy which the insurer invoked was that the issuance of
life insurance on a person without his knowledge or consent might be a source of
crime. The defendant relied on Mosely v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 167 S.C.
112, 166 S.E. 94 (1932), where a wife bought a life policy on her husband
without the husband's knowledge or consent and then slipped him arsenic; and
on Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E.2d 362 (1964), which
recognized an exception to the rule, such as where the insurance was bought
by parents on the life of their unemancipated minor children. At any rate, the
court found the cases distinguishable.
[Vol. 21
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Judge Spruill, whose trial court order was adopted by the su-
preme court in a per curiam decision:
The writer sees no reason of public policy to avoid this
contract on the life of the plaintiffs' son who was in
service overseas. Moreover, the defendant is hardly in a
position to assert that by its method of solicitation of
business and issuance of policies it is putting many
young men in danger of their lives at the hands of their
parents.
31
As to the conflicting policy provision which purported to re-
lieve the insurer of liability if the premium was not received
while the insured was alive, the court held that Western Union
had waived and was estopped from asserting the clause, in view
of the language of the letter of solicitation, the ownership certi-
ficate, and the in force certificate. The court relied on the well-
established proposition that where there is ambiguity in the parts
of an insurance contract, the beneficiaries are entitled to the bene-
fit of the language most favorable to them. Thus the trial court,
with the supreme court's blessing, held that the policy became
effective as of the date of the mailing of the ownership certifi-
cate and first premium,32 and gave judgment for the plaintiffs as
to the face amount of the policy.
The defense's final plea was that a contract to insure a life must
be a nullity if the life had in fact already ceased at the time when
the contract was made. The court could find no authority for this
proposition, and Judge Spruill made an analogy to marine in-
surance, where a policy may be antedated to cover a loss which
may have happened before the issuance of the policy:
[Tihe writer knows of no reason in law or public policy
why a policy of life insurance could not be antedated to
cover a risk which may already have occurred to a life,
when both parties are in ignorance of such loss and are
acting in good faith to cover the risk from a time prior
to actual issuance of the policy.33
Temporary Insurance -Eleven Days in May. When a pro-
spective insured completes the insurer's application forms and
31. 251 S.C. at 520, 164 S.E.2d at 219.
32. "It is to be noted that it is not the time of the postmark which is con-
trolling but the date of the postmark. This being so, it would clearly follow
that the policy, by its terms, is to be considered as effective from the begin-
ning of Febraury 14, 1966." 251 S.C. at 521, 164 S.E2d at 219.
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submits his first premium, he is often given a receipt which af-
fords interim coverage between the date of the application and
the actual issuance of the policy. The effectiveness of such a re-
ceipt is generally conditioned upon the insurability of the applic-
ant, and the insurance company has the reserved right to deter-
mine, in good faith, the applicant's insurability. 4
A quick-paced sequence of events in Hamrick v. Life and Cas-
ualty Insurance Co.8 5 caused the insurer to attempt to wriggle
free from liability on such a receipt, but the court found the com-
pany's actions lacking in good faith and reversed the trial court,
which had awarded the insurer a judgment non obstante veredic-
to after the jury had found for the plaintiff. A chronology of
the events follows: May 19, 1966-the insurer's agent solicited
Sutton to buy a $5,000 double indemnity life policy. Sutton paid
the premium of $18.30 and was issued a receipt affording tem-
porary insurance. May 0 - Sutton underwent a medical exam-
ination and was found to be in good health. May 21- Sutton
signed Part A of the application, thus putting the insurance into
effect according to the terms of the receipt. May 24- the insur-
er's office stamped the application as received. May 30 - Sutton
died from accidental causes. The plaintiffs, beneficiaries under
Sutton's policy, bought a $10,000 recovery, but the insurer, who
had written a letter disapproving Sutton's application, defended
on the ground that no contract of insurance existed. Thus the
case turned on whether or not the insurer acted in good faith in
rejecting Sutton's application. 6
Apparently the major South Carolina authority on an insurer's
good faith in rejecting an application comes from Stanton v.
Equitable Life Assurance SoCiety,37 but the value of that decision
is questionable because the court was badly divided.18 The court
quoted from the dissenting opinion the standards for judging the
insurer's actions:
34. 43 Aar. Jun. 2d Insurance § 222 (1969).
35. 165 S.E.2d 567 (S.C. 1969).
36. The plaintiffs on appeal urged the court to adopt the proposition, for
which there is a developing trend of authority from other jurisdictions, that a
receipt affords temporary insurance until the application is actually rejected and
the applicant is notified of the rejection. The court found it unnecessary to
adopt such a rule, since the case could be resolved simply on the question of the
insurer's good faith.
37. 137 S.C. 396, 135 S.E. 367 (1926).
38. Justice Watts wrote the main opinion, in which Acting Associate Jus-
tice Ramage concurred, sustaining a judgment for the plaintiffs on a "binding
receipt". Acting Associate Justice Purdy concurred only in the result. Justice
Cothran dissented in a lengthy opinion, 137 S.C. 396, 406-433, 135 S.E. 367,
370-380, with which Acting Associate Justice Marion concurred. Justices
10
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[I]n ordinary business transactions, not involving mat-
ters of personal taste and convenience, neither party has
the arbitrary right to decide the existence of a partic-
ular fact upon which his obligation under the contract
depends .... [T]he law requires that in that decision the
party who is vested with the power of decision shall act
fairly, honestly, and reasonably, in view of all the cir-
cumstances, and that the other party shall not be bound
by that decision when it is shown that the power of de-
cision has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, and
unreasonably.3 9
After the accidental death, the plaintiffs' attorney upon in-
quiry received the following reply from the insurer: "Mr. Sut-
ton's application for insurance was disapproved by our Under-
writing Department on the basis of all available facts and cir-
cumstances, particularly the occupational exposure that was in-
volved and a history of domestic difficulties."40 The court, in re-
viewing the facts pertinent to Sutton's application, found no
more "occupational exposure" than that the applicant was a mer-
chant operating a food store-filling station center, where he sold,
inter alia, hot dogs and beer. His domestic difficulties included
one divorce, a separation from his second wife and a return to
living with the first wife before the second divorce became final.
The insurer's principal witness was a member of its underwriting
department, who admitted after some hedging that he was aware
that Sutton was already dead when he considered the application.
Though this witness testified that he regarded Sutton as a sub-
standard risk, the court concluded that Sutton was satisfactorily
insurable under the plan for this policy. The underwriter testi-
fied he had refused the application because of criticism of Sut-
ton's drinking habits, but the precise nature of this criticism and
its source were vague. Thus the court noted that Sutton's domes-
tic difficulties and occupational exposure, the reasons listed in
the insurer's letter to the beneficiaries' attorney for rejecting
coverage, had nothing to do with the underwriter's decision.
This insurer was undoubtedly faced with a tempting situation,
knowing that the applicant was dead and still having an oppor-
Cothran and Marion dissented because they believed there was no proof that
the insurer acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably in refusing to accept
the application.
39. 165 S.E.2d at 569, quoting from Stanton v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 136 S.C. 396 at 422-23, 135 S.E. 367 at 376 (dissenting opinion).
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tunity to pass on the deceased's insurability, with a $10,000 liabil-
ity lying in the balance. But if the insurer was attempting to
camouflage its real reason for rejecting the application, it per-
formed a highly inept job of sweeping its dirt under the rug, and
the court was richly justified in concluding that there was a jury
issue as to the insurer's good faith, and in restoring to judgment
the jury's verdict for the plaintiffs.
E, wlusions - Commas F raugk7t With Meaning. The federal
case of G-rayson v. Aetna Insurance Co.4 ' involved the interpreta-
tion of a farm owner's liability policy. Both parties moved for
summary judgment on the ground that there was no real issue as
to any material fact, and so the court's inquiry was whether or
not any issue was actually presented. The insurer had issued the
policy under litigation to one Hudson. The plaintiff Grayson
was injured in the course of his employment on Hudson's farm,
sued Hudson, and got a $25,000 judgment in the state court.
Grayson contended that the judgment was within the coverage of
the policy and sought to collect his $25,000 from Aetna. The in-
surer contended that coverage to the plaintiff was precluded by
the following policy exclusion:
(d) under Coverage G, to bodily injury to any farm em-
ployee, arising out of and in the course of his employ-
ment by the Insured, and under Coverages G and H, to
any person, including any residence employee or in-
sured farm employee, [*1 (1) if the Insured has in effect
on the date of the occurrence a policy providing work-
men's compensation or occupational disease benefits
therefor, or (2) if benefits therefor are in whole or in
part either payable or required to be provided under any
workmen's compensation or occuptional disease law; but
this subdivision (2) does not apply with respect to
Coverage G unless such benefits are payable or required
to be provided by the Insured ;42
It was agreed that at the time of the injury, Hudson had no
workmen's compensation insurance nor any that provided oc-
cupational disease benefits, and that neither were required by
law.
Basically, Aetna contended that the first classification in the
above-quoted clause excluded Grayson from coverage. Grayson
41. 291 F. Supp. 720 (D.S.C. 1968).
42. Id. at 721-22. Asterisk indicates the crucial comma.
[Vol. 21
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contended that that exclusion only applied if Hudson had the
workmen's compensation policy or occupational disease benefits
in effect, or if the benefits from such policy or policies were in
whole or in part payable or required to be provided for. Each
party conjured up elaborate explanations as to why the clause
should be interpreted in its favor.
The plaintiff asserted the rule of interpretation that where re-
strictive words, phrases and commas are involved, (1) no comma
should be placed between restrictive clauses and those which they
restrict, and (2) a restrictive clause should be set off by a comma
only when it applies to several antecedent clauses which are them-
selves separated by a comma. In this crucial clause, the restric-
tive clauses as to workmen's compensation or occupational disease
benefits are set off by commas, and thus under plaintiff's rule of
construction, part two, the clauses would apply to both the first
("farm employee") and second ("any person") classes of people,
and thus Grayson reasoned the exclusionary clause does not ap-
ply.
Aetna pointed out that if the first part of the clause were
omitted altogether and the exclusion started off at the point,
"under Coverages G and H," then plaintiff's construction would
be correct- an employee would be excluded only if he were
covered by workmen's compensation. But under this construc-
tion, the defense reasoned, the first clause would have no mean-
ing at all. But summoning forth the well-ridden horse that every
clause of an insurance contract is intended to have some meaning,
Aetna asserted that it is improper to assume that the first clause
is without meaning. Thus, the defense argument breathlessly
concludes, if any meaning at all is given to the first part of the
exclusion, it must be that such injuries to farm employees are ex-
cluded generally.
Judge Simons, realizing that discretion is the better part of
valor, was not about to declare that these hair-splitting argu-
ments presented "no genuine issue as to any material fact."
"[T]he court concludes that the language and punctuation of the
exclusionary clause gives rise to conflicting reasonable inferences
that may be drawn as to the meaning thereof,"43 Judge Simons
wisely decreed, denying summary judgment to both parties and
leaving the argument to the finders of fact.
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S1 uffioienoy of Evidence - The Curse of Edward Crosby.
Edward Crosby must believe that he is the victim of the cruelest
jinx ever visited on a man in Horry County. His belief is not
without foundation. On October 2, 1966, Crosby, a farmer, was
knocked against a feed trough by a bull. Four days later he was
admitted to the Conway hospital with a badly bruised and swol-
len left leg, and because of it he was unable to work for some
time. While in the hospital, Crosby's doctor observed varicose
veins in his left leg, though Crosby later testified he had never
had varicose veins prior to the accident. Five months later
(March 5, 1967) Crosby was on some concrete steps when he was
knocked down by a large dog. He was admitted to the hospital
three days later complaining of chest pains, and he was subse-
quently operated on for a hernia of the diaphragm. He left the
hospital March 23. On April 23, Crosby was at a pond at his
home. When he tried to step into a boat, he fell again, reinjuring
his left leg. Back in the hospital four days later, he developed
phlebitis in this leg and was treated for this acute condition until
May 15, when he was sent home to convalesce.
Crosby sued Prudence Mutual Casualty Co. to collect benefits
under his accident policy. The jury awarded Crosby the monthly
indemnity provided in the policy for the eight months from Oc-
tober 1966 through May 1967. The insurer appealed, contending
that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that Crosby's
loss of time was from accident only, and that the only reasonable
inference to be drawn from the testimony was that Crosby did
not suffer total disability for the period claimed.
In its brief and not very lucid opinion, the supreme court in
Crosby v. P rudence Mutual Casualty Co.43A affirmed Crosby's
judgment. The court ruled that the evidence was sufficient to
establish that Crosby's loss of time was from the accident only,
citing without comment Kilgore v. Reserve Life Insurance 0o.
44
43A. 166 S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1969).
44. 231 S.C. 111, 97 S.E.2d 392 (1957). In Kilgore the injured insured
sought to recover disability benefits under his policy, and the insurer con-
tended that the disability was caused at least partially by the insured's arthritic
condition. The court held that the question of recovery was one for the jury,
and found that there was evidence in the very fact that prior to the accident the
plaintiff did not suffer from arthritis, but immediately after the fall he became
disabled. The doctor's testimony in the case was to the effect that plaintiff's
arthritic condition was of long duration, and the accident caused the arthritis
to flare up. The supreme court affirmed the plaintiff's recovery, saying "The
jury could have concluded from (the physician's] testimony that the arthritic
condition was dormant and only became active because of the accident. Such a
conclusion would warrant recovery." Id. at 116, 97 S.E2d at 394.
[Vol. 21
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The insurer's argument in Crosby rested upon the doctor's
testimony that the varicosity of plaintiff's veins was a factor in
causing phlebitis. The court held that testimony supported the
conclusion that the phlebitis arose while plaintiff was totally dis-
abled from his injuries, and after the phlebitis subsided the dis-
ability resulting from the accidents continued. In these circum-
stances, the insurer would not be relieved o-f liability even if the
temporary, acute phlebitis had been entirely independent of the
accidental injuries. The court further held that Crosby's testi-
mony gave the jury sufficient evidence to support the finding as
to the duration of the disability.4 15
C. AuTomOBmE INStuANCE
Theft Coverage -Ambiguity. Hann v. Carolina Casualty In-
surance Co.,46 concerned primarily with the construction of a
rather vague policy provision, also had some significant things to
say about the proper method for resolving ambiguities in insur-
ance contracts in South Carolina. The insurer had issued a com-
bination policy to Han, which covered his long-distance tractor-
trailer unit. The policy admittedly provided liability insurance
for both the tractor and trailer and theft coverage for the tractor.
The issue in the case was whether the policy covered theft of the
trailer.
Certain policy provisions limited the insurer's liability for
theft to $8,000 and included data on the tractor and trailer in the
policy section calling for "description of the automobile and facts
respecting its purchase by the named insured." The latter section
listed only the tractor's date of purchase and its value ($8,000),
without including such information on the trailer. The insurer
contended that the only reason the trailer was described in the
policy was to afford it liability coverage, and since the cost of the
tractor and the limit of theft liability were each set at $8,000, it
should be clear that the theft coverage was limited to the tractor.
45. The insurer also argued that Crosby was not under the regular care of
a physician for the entire period for which the indemnity was awarded, but this
question was not considered because it was not raised by the pleadings:
The policy provision relied upon [that the insured was to be under
the regular care of a doctor? The court does not make clear the
provisions of the clause being argued.] is a condition of coverage
rather than an element of the policy definition of the term "total
disability". Hence, compliance with this condition is a distinct issue
from that of the duration of total disability.
166 S.E.2d at 203.
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The lower court agreed with the insurer's construction. The
supreme court was not so quick to go along with the insurer's
theory, finding it "rather a strained construction" at best, and
certainly not the only reasonable construction of the policy.
Rather, the court concluded that the policy provisions and de-
scriptions gave rise to a patent ambiguity. The court did not
hesitate to penalize the insurer for not using simple language to
make the policy indisputably clear:
If it was the intention of the parties to afford no theft
coverage for the trailer, it would have been quite simple
for the insurer to have inserted in the policy with respect
to theft coverage "tractor only", or, following the de-
scription of the trailer, to have inserted "insured against
liability only".47
Instead the policy was enshrouded with doubt, which in South
Carolina is adverse for the insurer. "We uniformly give the in-
sured the benefit of any doubt in the construction of the terms
used in an insurance policy,"48 the court stated, holding that the
policy thus must be construed as providing theft coverage for
the trailer. The trial court was reversed, with the admonition
that it should have directed a verdict against the insurer as to
liability, and submitted to the jury the question as to the amount
of loss.
On the problem of whether the policy's ambiguity presented an
issue for the court's determination or one for the jury under pro-
per instructions from the court, Justice Bussey in rendering the
court's opinion attempted to clarify possible confusion in the
South Carolina precedents. Noting that there is apparent au-
thority for the broad proposition that any kind of ambiguity in
an insurance policy presents an issue for the jury, the court found
that in many of these instances the court failed to distinguish be-
tween patent and latent ambiguities, which difference has im-
portant ramifications as to who should resolve the doubt. But
Justice Bussey set the record straight:
[T]his court in a long line of cases dealing with ambigui-
ties in insurance policies, which were in fact patent am-
biguities, has held, either expressly or in effect, that the
construction of the particular policy was a matter for de-
47. Id. at 422.
48. Id. at 423.
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termination by the court and that no jury issue was in-
volved.
49
Thus the court justified its holding that the construction of this
policy provision as to liability was for the court, which should
have directed a verdict on that issue for the plaintiff.l°
Liability Insurance - "Arising out of the use". On Christmas
Day, 1966, Lee Plaxco drove his car to the Greenville Municipal
Airport, from whence he planned a trip in his airplane. Finding
his airplane battery too weak to start the engine, the quick-witted
Plaxco pulled his car up under the airplane's wing, connected the
car battery to the airplane battery with jumper cables, and thus
started the airplane engine. But alas, when Plaxco alighted from
his plane to disconnect the jumper cables, the airplane's brakes
gave way and the resulting unpiloted taxi came to a smashing
conclusion against another airplane.
The owners of the damaged plane sued the unfortunate
Plaxco for their loss, and Plaxco brought this action against his
automobile liability insurer, seeking a declaration as to his in-
surer's liability for the damage in question. The policy contained
the usual clauses obligating the insurer to pay for damages "aris-
ing out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any automobile,"
and to defend any suit against the insured alleging such damages.
Thus the ponderous question the court had to consider in Plaxco
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.51 was whether Plaxco's
use of his car battery to crank his airplane engine constituted a
use of the automobile within the policy's meaning. Justice Lewis
for the court concluded that it did not.
The court found nothing in the circumstances to show the
necessary causal connection between the automobile battery's use
as a source of power and the subsequent forward movement of
49. Id. The court cites nine South Carolina cases as authority for this rule,
the latest being Columbia College v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 250 S.C. 237, 157
S.E.2d 416 (1967).
50. The insurer had counterclaimed in this case, in the event that its denial
of coverage of the trailer for theft was defeated, to have the policy reformed
on the ground of mutual mistake. Since the trial court had sustained the
insurer's first defense, it did not rule on the counterclaim and the supreme court
was faced with the resolution of that issue. Reviewing the testimony of the
insurer's agent (there was some dispute as to whether the insurance agent who
sold the policy to Han was in fact an agent of the insurer) and of the plain-
tiff, the court concluded that the evidence tending to prove a mutual mistake
fell short of the required clear and convincing burden. The only possible
mistake, the court found, was a unilateral error on the insurer's part in afford-
ing theft coverage on the trailer. Thus the court refused to reform the policy.
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the airplane--"The facts show that the accident resulted from the
use of the airplane and not the insured automobile," 52 the court
said matter-of-factly. And since the complaint of the owners of
the damaged airplane did not allege facts which revealed any
negligent use of the auto, the loss was not within the policy cover-
age and the insurer was under no obligation to defend.
A more sober case involving the "use of the vehicle" clause in
a liability policy was Home Indemnity Co. v. Harleysville Mu-
tual Insurance Co., 3 which considers the effect of a "loading and
unloading" clause as an expansion of the "use of the vehicle"
coverage. The litigation resulted from the following facts:
Marshall Enterprises was a trucking concern which regularly
delivered live chickens to Marshall Farms, where the chickens
were processed for market. On September 28, 1964, in accordance
with established procedure, Enterprises' driver brought the truck
to Farms' premises to be unloaded. Then a Farms employee be-
gan driving the truck to the weighing station on the premises,
but on the way the truck struck Leroy Garrett, causing personal
injury in the agreed sum of $13,500. Home Indemnity was
Farms' liability insurer, and Harleysville Mutual was Enter-
prises' liability insurer, so this action sought a declaratory judg-
ment to determine which insurer was liable to pay for Garrett's
injuries. The trial court found against Harleysville.
Harleysville's policy on the trucking company contained the
usual provisions for bodily injury liability, an omnibus clause
covering any person using the vehicle with the insured's permis-
sion, and the following clause: "Use of an automobile includes
the loading and unloading thereof." 54 In the court's approach to
its decision, the first issue to be decided was whether the accident
occurred during "loading and unloading." The court determined
that the whole process constituted "loading and unloading" the
truck under an application of the "complete operation" doctrine.
This theory, as opposed to the "coming to rest" doctrine of "load-
ing and unloading", covers "the entire process involved in the
movement of goods from the moment when they are given into
the insured's possession until they are turned over at the place of
destination to the party to whom delivery is to be made .... 1)55
52. Id. at 801.
53. 166 S.E.2d 819 (S.C. 1969).
54. Id. at 822.
55. Id. The court claimed to have "inferentially approved" the "complete
operation" doctrine in Wrenn & Outlaw, Inc. v. Employers' Liab. Assurance
Corp., 246 S.C. 97, 142 S.E2d 741 (1965). There a grocery shopper was
[Vol. 21
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Since Harleysville's policy contained the omnibus clause, the
court concluded that the loading and unloading clause combined
with the omnibus clause to give Enterprise coverage under its
Harleysville policy.56
The second issue in the case was the construction of an exclu-
sionary endorsement attached to the Harleysville policy, preclud-
ing Harleysville from liability if the accident occurring during
loading or unloading "occurs on premises... owned, rented or
controlled either by the person... against whom claim is made
or suit is brought .... 57 But this exclusion was not to apply if
the claim or suit was brought against a bailee of the vehicle.
Since the accident occurred on Farms' premises and Garrett had
made claim against them, Harleysville would be free of liability
because of the exclusionary clause unless Farms was a bailee, in
which case the clause would be of no effect. Applying bailment
law, the court found that Farms was a bailee, and thus the ex-
press language of the exclusionary clause rendered it inapplic-
able. Thus the court concluded that Harleysville provided cover-
age for the accident, and reversed the lower court so that judg-
ment was given in favor of Home.58
injured when the grocery store's bag boy slammed the shopper's car door shut
on her hand while putting the groceries in her car. The suit was brought by
the grocery store to determine if the shopper's liability insurer was liable for
the cost of the injury.
The use to which Miss Coleman [the unfortunate shopper] was
putting her car on the day of the accident, grocery shopping, is a
use ... within the contemplation of the parties when the policy was
issued. In order to use the automobile for grocery shopping, it
was, of course, necessary to load the groceries therein, which, as a
matter of course, involved opening and closing the door, all of
which was a part and parcel of the use to which the automobile
was then being put; a use which we think was within the language
and intent of the policy.
Id. at 103, 142 S.E.2d at 743. The plaintiff's policy here also included the
loading and unloading clause. The court did not discuss the complete opera-
tion or coming to rest doctrines. Wrenn, is discussed in Kemmerlin, Insurance,
1964-65 Survey of South Carolina Law, 18 S.C.L. Rv. 68, 72-73 (1966).
56. The court relied on Standard Oil Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 324 S.W.2d
331 (Tex. Ct of Civ. App. 1959) for the proposition that an omnibus clause
covers third parties engaged in loading and unloading operations, and on 7
Am. JuR. 2d Automobile Insurance § 89 (1963) for the proposition that a
stranger to the vehicle is covered as an additional insured within the meaning
of an omnibus clause.
57. 166 S.E.2d at 823.
58. Justice Brailsford, joined by Justice Bussey, concurred in the result.
Justice Brailsford agreed that Harleysville was liable, but he saw no need to
delve into the "loading and unloading" rigamarole.
The injury-producing accident was an ordinary collision between
a moving vehicle and a pedestrian. This use of the truck was
with the permission of the insured and fastens liability upon the
insurer. It is beside the point whether the transportation of the
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"With The Penmissiom". Another frequent provision found in
automobile liability policies is the coverage the omnibus clause af-
fords to those who drive an automobile with the permission of the
insured or of the owner. Cooper v. Firemnn's Fund Inurance
67o.0 involved the application of two such clauses to the follow-
ing facts:
While driving a pickup truck owned by O'Neal Tanner, Harry
Anderson had a collision with William Cooper, resulting in per-
sonal injury and property damage to Cooper. Cooper got a $5,000
judgment against Anderson, then brought suit against Firemen's
Fund and State Farm Mutual insurance companies to collect the
judgment. Firemen's Fund was Tanner's liability insurer, and
this policy included in the definition of "insured" "any person
while using the automobile ... provided the actual use of the
automobile is by the named insured or such spouse or with the
permission of either." State Farm was Anderson's liability insur-
er, and its policy extended coverage to Anderson while driving a
non-owned automobile, "[p]rovided such use . .. is with the per-
mission of the owner or person in lawful possession of such au-
tomobile." The two insurance companies defended on the ground
that Anderson was not using Tanner's truck with permission, and
they gained a directed verdict on this defense in the trial court.
Thus the only issue in Cooper was whether there was enough
evidence for the plaintiff to get to the jury on the question of
whether Anderson was using the truck with Tanner's permission.
On the ample basis of the testimony, the supreme court af-
firmed the directed verdict, saying that the only inference that
could be drawn was that Anderson had no permission to use the
truck. The court noted that even implied consent "requires some-
thing more than mere sufferance or tolerance without taking
steps to prevent the use of the automobile and permission cannot
be implied from possession and use of the automobile without the
knowledge of the named insured."00
process.... In my view, this is a simple use case. Hence, Harleys-
ville provided coverage.
166 S.E.2d at 824. The author agrees with the concurring justices. Most of
the "loading and unloading" cases apparently arise when the vehicle involved
is in a stable position, rather than in motion. See 7 Air. Jura. 2d Automobile In-
sturance § 87 (1963). But here the truck was in motion and the accident was
the typical vehicle-pedestrian collision; thus, as Justice Brailsford says, there
is no need to invoke the loading and unloading clause.
59. 167 S.E.2d 745 (S.C. 1969).
60. 167 S.E.2d at 747. Cooper also claimed on appeal that the exclusion in
the State Farm policy was void because of conflict with S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 46-750.31 (Supp. 1968), but the question was not properly before the court,
having not been raised below, and was not considered.
[Vol. 21
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"Use Off Public Roads". On August 18, 1967, Grady W. Liv-
ingston, who was employed at G. D. Livingston's dirt race track,
was seated in front of a ticket office near the track when a 1955
Chevrolet racer, driven and owned by W. R. Bonnette, roared
past. At that instant a tire broke free from Bonnette's racer and
crashed into Livingston, causing his death. The administrator of
Livingston's estate subsequently brought action on an automobile
liability policy held by the deceased's wife. The policy contained
the following agreement:
For purposes of this policy "land motor vehicle" does
not include ... a farm type tractor, farm machinery or
implements, or equipment designed principally for use
off public roads.61
Thus the issue in the federal district court case of Livingston v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.62 was whether or not Bonnette's
car was designed principally for use off public roads. The court
considered all the alterations that had been made from the origi-
nal stock 1955 Chevrolet body style-when Bonnette bought the
car, it was without motor or transmission; a 1963 Chevrolet en-
gine and transmission were installed; the wheel centers were re-
moved and replaced with quarter-inch steel plates; the car doors
were welded shut; the headlights, tail lights, brake lights, horn,
muffler and all glass except the windshield were removed; steel
roll bars were inserted; the speedometer and fuel gauge were re-
moved; there was no registration with the state highway depart-
ment; the vehicle was used solely for racing purposes and was
transported from track to track by use of a trailer-and con-
cluded that the original design did not control, and that the car
in its altered condition was designed principally for use off pub-
lic highways.
63
61. Livingston v. Nationwide Mut Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 1122, 1124 (D.S.C.
1969).
62. 295 F. Supp. 1122 (D.S.C. 1969).
63. The court relied principally on an Ohio case, Beagle v. Automobile Club
Ins. Co., 176 N.E.2d 542 (Ohio Com. P1. 1960), with an almost indistinguishable
fact situation, for its decision.
It is true that this car was originally designed and sold by the
manufacturer as a stock car for use on the highways. But the
Court does not feel that its original design is what controls ...
[T]he fact that it could be driven on the highway, even though
[illegally], does not change the fact that the vehicle had been de-
signed for racing purposes.
Id. at 544. Both the Ohio court and the Livingston court rejected plaintiff's
arguments that the rule ejusdern generis be applied to limit the language "or
equipment designed principally for use off public roads" to farm type ma-
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Certificate of Title, Ownership, and Liability Insurance: Sad
Injustice Laid To Rest. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.
V. Foaby64 affirms the federal courts' return to reason after the
misadventure of Clause v. American Mutual Liability Insurance
Oo.01 The Clause court, in making an Erie-required interpreta-
tion of South Carolina statutes, held that where an automobile
dealer did not comply with the statute requiring the dealer, when
transferring an auto of which he was not the registered title-
holder, to deliver to the highway department documents includ-
ing certification that the new applicant for title had liability
insurance coverage or equivalents, then the dealer retained owner-
ship of the car for purposes of his garage liability policy, mak-
ing the transferee an omnibus insured under the dealer's policy
and thus making the dealer's insurer liable for any torts result-
ing from the use of that vehicle.66 In 1968 the South Carolina
Supreme Court had its first real chance to deal with Clause, and
the state court refused to follow the federal interpretation in
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. a. Boykin.67 Boykin held
that the dealer's failure to comply with the title certificate law
requirements in regard to delivery of the old certificate of title
and application for a new certificate to the state highway de-
partment following the sale of a used car to a buyer did not
prevent the title from passing to the buyer, and thus the dealer's
garage liability policy did not extend coverage to the buyer.
Fomby also involved a garage liability policy and a title in a
state of confusion at the time of an accident. In this instance,
George Pollard, an employee of Summers Enterprises doing
business as AAMCO Transmissions of Columbia, needed a car to
commute to work. His employer advanced money to Pollard to
buy a used car, the two agreeing that the car would be registered
in Summers Enterprises' name until Pollard completed paying
the advanced price. Pollard completed payment to Summers on
August 20, 1966, and two weeks later he was involved in an acci-
dent in which his passenger, George Fomby, was injured. Fomby
sued Pollard, seeking $120,000 damages for injuries. Then United
machinery or implements" covered any kind of farm machinery, and if the
concluding phrase was to have any meaning at all, it must relate to equip-
ment other than farm equipment.
64. 297 F. Supp. 1153 (D.S.C. 1969).
65. 344 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1965).
66. Clouse and the pre-Clouse cases are discussed in Kemnmerlin, Insurance,
1964-65 Survey of South Carolina Law, 18 S.C.L. REv. 68, 74-82 (1966).
67. 251 S.C. 236, 161 S.E.2d 818 (1968). Clouse and the post-Clouse cases
including Boykin are discussed in Insurance, 1968 Survey of South Carolina
Law, 20 S.C.L. REv. 590, 610-14 (1968).
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States Fidelity and Guaranty, the garage liability insurer for
Summers Enterprises, brought suit to determine its responsibility
to Fomby. The insurer, relying on Boykin, contended it had no
liability to the injured.
The facts showed that Pollard clearly exercised ownership of
the car, keeping it at his home, financing repairs, and paying
operating expenses. However, after the final payment to Sum-
mers, Pollard and Summers never completed the process of get-
ting the registration changed.
Judge Hemphill relied solely on Boykin, "where the facts are
remarkedly similar, the interpretation of the law clear, and the
sad injustice of Clouse is laid to rest."68 The court concluded
that the failure to register the car in Pollard's name did not ne-
gate the clear intention of the parties that the car should belong
to Pollard. Thus the insurer was found to have no responsibility
to defend Pollard or respond to Fomby.
Omnibus Exclusion. In a one-paragraph per curiam decision of
Heaton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Go., 69 the
Fourth Circuit affirmed Judge Russell's district court opinion,70
which upheld the validity of an exclusionary provision in the
omnibus clause that exempted from coverage an accident invol-
ving the use of a non-owned automobile in the automobile busi-
ness.7
1
Uninsured Motor Vehicle Exclusion: Statutory Confusion.
The supreme court decided that a truck which was not covered
by liability insurance was not an uninsured motor vehicle in
Jones v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty CO.72 This somewhat
paradoxical opinion came out of the following facts:
The plaintiff's intestate, while operating his own automobile
which was covered by liability insurance from Southern Farm,
was killed in a collision with a truck owned by Florence County
and driven by Marlowe, an indigent prisoner. The plaintiff set-
tled with the county, but wished to pursue his claim against Mar-
lowe. Since the county did not have liability coverage on the
truck, plaintiff's contention was that the truck was therefore an
68. 297 F. Supp. 1153, 1154 (footnote omitted).
69. 398 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1968).
70. 278 F. Supp. 725 (D.S.C. 1968).
71. The district court opinion is discussed in Contracts, 1968 Survey of South
Carolina Law, 20 S.C.L. Ra'v. 536, 541, and in Insurance, id. 590 at 620-22,
625 (n. 109).
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uninsured motor vehicle, and sought a declaration that Southern
Farm must then be obligated to defend the plaintiff's claim
against Marlowe under the uninsured motorist provision.
The policy in question contained an exclusionary clause that an
uninsured automobile did not include one owned by a state or one
of its subdivisions, an exclusion inserted in reliance on Section
46-704 of the South Carolina Code which provides that the Motor
Safety Responsibility Act does not apply to state-owned vehi-
cles.7 3 The plaintiff conceded that this exclusion applied to the
provisions of the act as enacted in 1952, but pointed out that the
provisions of the act which provide protection against operators
of uninsured automobiles 74 were not enacted until 1959. Thus the
plaintiff urged that the state-owned vehicle exclusion did not ap-
ply to the more recent legislation.
The court, in a five-paragraph decision which affirmed and
reprinted the trial court holding of Judge McGowan, concluded
that Section 46-704 applied to all the provisions of the act and
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint with this brief explanation:
It is my conclusion that the provisions of Section 46-704
apply to all the provisions contained in the entire Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which provisions con-
stitute Chapter 8 of Title 46 of the 1962 Code, as
amended. This is clear from the wording of the Section
itself. The title of the Section states: "Chapter Inap-
plicable to Certain Motor Vehicles." The text of the
Section begins with the following: "This Chapter shall
not apply with respect to any motor vehicle owned by"
the designated political entities.' 5
Justice Bussey filed an impressive dissent, not agreeing that
the resolution of the statutes was so simple. Bussey noted that
73. S. C. CODE ANN. § 46-704 (1962) provides: "This chapter shall not
apply . . . to any motor vehicle owned by the United States, this State or
any olitical subdivision of this State or any municipality therein..
~'S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31 (Supp. 1968) provides:
(3) The term 'uninsured vzwtor vehicle' means a motor vehicle
as to which (a) there is no bodily injury liability insurance and
property damage liability insurance ...
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-750.33 (Supp. 1968) provides:
No such policy or contract shall be so issued or delivered unless
it contains a provision by endorsement or otherwise, herein referred
to as the uninsured motorist provision, undertaking to pay the
insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle....
75. 251 S.C. 446, 450, 163 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1968).
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from "the plain, clear and unequivocal language" of Section 46-
750.31,7( Florence County's truck was an uninsured motor vehi-
cle. Southern Farm's contention that the truck was not an unin-
sured vehicle rested solely on Section 46-704, 7 7 the political ex-
clusion clause. Thus there was a prima facie conflict between the
two sections, Justice Bussey declared, necessitating an inquiry
into the history of the statutes for proper construction.
Searching the history, Justice Bussey found that Section 46-
704 was originally a section of the Motor Safety Responsibility
Act of 1952.78 It originally read, "This act shall not apply . ..
rather than "This chapter shall not apply . . .", act becoming
chapter upon the codification of the 1962 Code. Sections 46-750.31
and -750.33 came from a 1959 enactment, 79 at which time Section
46-704 had not been codified and thus still said act, not chapter.
The 1959 act was the first to contain uninsured motorist provi-
sions; the 1952 act sought to achieve a degree of financial respon-
sibility on the part of tort-feasors. Said Justice Bussey:
At the time of the adoption of the 1959 Act, I think
there was no conflict between Sec. 11 of said Act, pro-
viding for uninsured motorist coverage, and Sec. 33 of
the 1952 Act which then contained the word "act" rather
than the word "chapter" ......
Even if there was a conflict, Justice Bussey concluded that the
1959 act's standard repealer eliminated the inconsistency in favor
of the more recent legislation; thus the conclusion must be that
Section 46-704 did not apply to Section 46-750.31. Further, Jus-
tice Bussey found the term "uninsured motor vehicle" defined
separately and differently in several places, for obviously differ-
ent purposes:
Under the clear and unambiguous language of that de-
finition [Section 46-750.31], enacted expressly for the
purpose of determining what constitutes an "uninsured
motor vehicle" within the coverage of the required un-
insured motorist endorsement, the truck owned by
Florence County was an "uninsured motor vehicle".8 1
76. Set out supra, note 74.
77. Set out supra, note 73.
78. XLVII S. C. STATS. AT LARGE 1853, 1872 (No. 723, § 33, 1952).
79. LI S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 567 (No. 311, 1959).
80. 251 S.C. 446, 453, 163 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1968).
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Another case concerned with the definition of an "uninsured
motor vehicle" was Gary v. Nationwide 2utual Insurance 0o.82
Here the plaintiff, who had uninsured motorist coverage from
Travelers Insurance Co., was involved in a collision with a tort-
feasor insured by Nationwide. The Nationwide policy excluded
the operation of a stolen car from its coverage, and the car which
collided with the plaintiff had, in fact, been stolen. Thus the ex-
clusionary clause applied so that the stolen vehicle was an "unin-
sured motor vehicle" under Section 46-750.11(3), since it was
then a motor vehicle on which there was no liability insurance.
Nationwide had appeared in the trial court for the tort-feasor,
but with a full reservation of its rights, and it withdrew when it
became clear that its exclusionary clause would have the intended
effect. Travelers appealed from the adverse lower court decision,
contending that the tort-feasor did not become uninsured until
Nationwide withdrew from the case. But the supreme court dis-
tinguished Travelers' cited authorities and affirmed the lower
court, holding that Travelers would be liable to Gary under the
uninsured motorist coverage.
Automatic Insurance Clause: Two for the Price of One. The
standard automatic insurance clause found in some liability
policies, which provides immediate coverage for new automobiles
as they are acquired by the insured, was again before the court8 3
in Washington v. National Service Fire Insurance (o.84 On Au-
gust 30, 1965, National Service had issued liability insurance on
a 1957 Ford, listing Marion Boyles and Edna Mae Brown as the
named insureds. On December 20, 1965, Boyles and Brown
bought a 1961 Chevrolet, but not as a replacement for the Ford.
That same day Boyles approached the insurer's agent to secure in-
surance on the Chevrolet. The agent explained to Boyles that the
insurer had ceased to write new business in South Carolina and
that no additional vehicles would be covered, so that the newly-
acquired Chevrolet could not be added to the existing policy. The
agent offered to request a policy endorsement substituting the
Chevrolet for the Ford and to seek an additional policy covering
the Ford. Boyles agreed to these proposals and paid the agent a
premium. On December 23 the agent forwarded the request for
the endorsement to the insurer's general agent in Atlanta. On
82. 251 S.C. 530, 164 S.E.2d 213 (1968).
83. For a discussion of two other recent cases involving the automatic in-
surance provision, see Innurance, 1968 Survey of South Carolina Law, 20 S.C.L.
av. 590, 622-25 (1968).
84. 168 S.E.2d 90 (S.C. 1969).
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December 24, Brown was driving the Ford and had a collision,
resulting in injuries to her passenger Betty Washington. On De-
cember 27, the endorsement was issued eliminating the Ford from
the policy and adding the Chevrolet.
From these facts the ensuing litigation can easily be foreseen:
Washington obtained a default judgment against Brown, then
sued the insurer as Brown's liability carrier. Washington ob-
tained a verdict of $10,000 against the insurer, who appealed con-
tending that the endorsement relieved National from liability for
the December 24 collision.
The supreme court, in upholding the judgment for Washing-
ton, found that only the insurer's general agent could effect an
amendment of the policy. 5 Thus neither Boyles' assent to the
local agent's suggestions, nor that agent's request for an endorse-
ment, worked to change the policy. Thus, on the day of the acci-
dent the Ford was the owned automobile listed in the policy and
was covered by its provisions. The court's dictum adds, "The 1961
Chevrolet was also a covered vehicle (not because of a substitu-
tion of vehicles) per force the automatic insurance provision of
the policy .... ,,86
Excess Insurance: A Time To Defend. Insurance policies
sometimes provide that as to a particular coverage the policy will
give "excess" insurance only. This provision means that the in-
surance company which issued the policy is not liable for any
part of the loss covered by other insurance, but is liable only
when the amount of loss is in excess of the coverage provided by
the other insurance policy.87 The issue of when an excess insurer
85. Id. at 91-92.
86. Id. at 92. Apparently there ig some confusion as to the effect of the
automatic insurance provision. The court reports that National, apparently
at the direction of the South Carolina Insurance Commission, had ceased to
write new business in South Carolina, and it notified its local agents that no
additional vehicles would be covered. Undoubtedly the agent whom Boyles
contacted was acting under this premise when he suggested substituting the
Chevrolet for the Ford as the insured automobile and trying to get an assigned
risk policy on the Ford. But the court construes the policy as covering both
the Ford and the Chevrolet from the time of the acquisition of the Chevrolet,
thus making unnecessary the agent's attempts to secure the endorsement for the
Chevrolet and find new insurance for the Ford. The court noted that the
endorsement sought would be appropriate in a replacement situation, but that
it was inappropriate as to the acquisition of an additional car, for which the
policy provided automatic coverage without impairment of the insurance on the
car already listed in the policy.
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should step into a claim was raised by Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. v. South Carolina Insurance Co.88
Hartford had issued automobile liability insurance to Mrs.
Tomberlin, with a $20,000 coverage limit for bodily injury for
each person injured, and Hartford made the usual promise to de-
fend. The insured and relatives of her household, including son
Bedford, were also insured with respect to a non-owned automo-
bile, but the policy provided that as to such a car, the coverage
was excess insurance only. Carolina had issued automobile liabil-
ity insurance to William Cameron, with $10,000 coverage limit
for bodily injury for each person injured arising out of the use
of the insured car. This policy, which also contained the promise
of the insurer to defend, covered as an additional insured any
person driving the insured car with the named insured's permis-
sion. Thus it came to be that when son Bedford had an acci-
dent while driving Cameron's Ford with his permission, Tomber-
lin was covered by both Carolina (as an additional insured dri-
ving Cameron's car) and by Hartford (as Mrs. Tomberlin's re-
lative of the household driving a non-owned auto). By the pro-
visions of the policies, Carolina had primary coverage; Hartford
provided excess coverage.
So when the occupants of the other car, the Byrum family, in-
stituted a flurry of tort actions against Tomberlin, whose liabili-
ty for the accident was clear, Carolina fulfilled its obligation to
defend and retained counsel. Hartford took no action. Carolina
settled within its policy limits all the Byrum claims except one
for injuries, a $40,000 suit. Carolina, wishing to settle this action
also, tried to get Hartford to participate in the negotiations.
When Hartford refused to take over the defense of the case, Car-
olina agreed to pay $10,000 on the claim, the limit of its liability
under the Cameron policy. Then Carolina, with leave of the court,
withdrew from the case. Hartford then took over the defense,
but could not negotiate a settlement. The trial resulted in a ver-
dict of $33,000. Hartford paid its $20,000 policy limit, then
brought this action against Carolina to recover its cost of the de-
fense of the action following Carolina's withdrawal, contending
that its defense had been prejudiced by such withdrawal. Caro-
lina's demurrer to this complaint was sustained, but this action
was reversed by the supreme court and the case remanded for
88. 166 S.E.2d 762 (S.C. 1969). The parties are hereinafter referred to
simply as "Hartford" and "Carolina".
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trial 89 The case was then referred to a master, who recom-
mended judgment for Carolina. The master's report was af-
firmed by the lower court and in turn by the supreme court.
The court noted that it is settled law that whether an insur-
ance company is required to defend an action against its insured
is determined by the allegations of the complaint in such an
action. The insurer must defend the suit if the injured party
states a claim for an injury covered by the policy. Since the com-
plaint by the Byrums alleged damages of $40,000, the claim
was brought within the liability coverage afforded Tomberlin by
both the Carolina and Hartford policies. The court held that
Hartford's obligation to defend was absolute--"It became abso-
lute at the time the action was instituted because the allegations
of the complaint brought the claim within the coverage of the
Hartford policy." 90
Thus the court observed that when Hartford assumed the de-
fense upon Carolina's withdrawal it was merely beginning to dis-
charge a duty it owed the insured from the beginning. So Hart-
ford had no valid claim to be reimbursed by Carolina for defend-
ing the suit-after Carolina paid its policy limit, Hartford alone
was liable to pay the remaining obligation for the suit's defense.
Duties Of The Insured (Cooperation Clause): With All De-
liberate Non-Cooperation. Cooperation clauses, common provi-
sions in liability policies, require that the insured will cooperate
with the insurer by carrying out such insurer's requests as attend-
ing hearings and trials, effecting settlements, securing and giv-
89. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 249
S.C. 120, 153 S.E2d 124 (1967). In sustaining the demurrer, the trial judge
had considered the policies themselves, which had not been made a part of the
complaint. In passing on a demurrer, the court is restricted to the facts as they
appear in the pleadings. See Pleadings, 1967 Survey of South Carolina Law,
19 S.C.L. REv. 611, 615 (1967).
90. 166 S.E.2d 762, 765. The court cites no South Carolina law for this
holding, but relies on two recent North Carolina cases, Strickland v. Hughes,
273 N.C. 481, 160 S.F_2d 313 (1968) and Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. North
Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 358, 152 S.E.2d 513 (1967).
The South Carolina federal district court has considered similar excess in-
surance clauses in two recent declaratory judgment cases, Macloskie v. Royal
Indem. Co., 254 F. Supp. 782 (D.S.C. 1966), aff'd per curiam 374 F.2d 892
(4th Cir. 1967), and Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dees, 235 F. Supp. 515 (D.S.C.
1964). In Macloskie, Georgia law was applied; the court held, inter alia,
that where the coverage of insured's liability insurer was secondary and excess
coverage only, the insurer had no responsibility to defend the insured and its
liability was brought into play "only by judgments being obtained against
plaintiff in excess of [the primary insurer's] coverage to plaintiff under its
policy." 254 F. Supp. at 792. Thus the district court seemed to apply a judgment




Published by Scholar Commons, 1969
SouTH CAROLixA LAw RE iEw
ing evidence, and the like. A material breach of this provision
by the insured constitutes a defense to liability on the policy.91
Although there appears to be some minor split of authority on
the matter in American jurisdictions,92 in South Carolina the in-
surer has the burden of proving the breach of a cooperation
clause.
93
The insurer failed to meet this burden, according to the su-
preme court, in Evans v. American Home Assurance Oo.94 Evans
was involved in an auto collision with Walton in Greenville on
February 18, 1967. At the time Walton was a seaman stationed
at Charleston and was driving an Econo-Car. He was arrested
and charged with reckless driving and leaving the scene of a col-
lision. Evans commenced suit against Walton and Econo-Car the
following April. At that time Walton was AWOL from the
Navy and was served through the Chief Highway Commis-
sioner.05 An attorney was retained to represent Econo-Car and
Walton, and he found out in July that Walton was AWOL. The
attorney made no further attempt to locate him until shortly be-
fore trial, which was to come up in the Greenville County Court
term beginning on August 28.
August 24 (a.m.) -the attorney moved unsuccessfully for a
continuance on the ground that Walton could not be found. Au-
gust 14 (p.m.) - as a result of a private detective's investiga-
tion, Walton got in touch with the attorney. August 25- the at-
torney wrote Walton at several possible addresses, emphasizing
the importance of his being in court on the 28th. August 26-
the attorney interviewed Walton at his sister's home, and a con-
stable served a subpoena on Walton. Walton was "friendly and
cooperative" and told the attorney that he would be in court on
the 28th. August 28- Walton did not show up for court. His
trial was to come up the next day, and the attorney again made
unavailing attempts to contact him. August 29 - Walton did not
show up for court. At the trial, the attorney did not inform the
court that Walton had been located after the motion for contin-
uance had been refused. The motion to continue was not renewed
and no request was made for an opportunity to investigate Wal-
91. 44 Ai. Ju. 2d Inmirance § 1560 (1969).
92. Id. at § 1563.
93. See the authorities reviewed in Crook v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.2d 241 (1960).
94. 166 S.E.2d 811 (S.C. 1969).
95. Pursuant to S.C. CoDE Aim. § 10-431 (1962).
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ton's failure to attend trial. The record is silent as to any reason
for Walton's failure to show up.
Thus Evans gained a judgment against Walton and sued
American Home, liability carrier for Econo-Car. The insurer dis-
claimed liability on the ground that Walton had violated the co-
operation clause. The trial court ruled that the insurer failed to
prove a violation of the cooperation clause, and the supreme court
affirmed.
The court found "settled law" that a liability insurer has a
defense on the ground that the insured has violated the coopera-
tion clause only when the breach has been material and has re-
sulted in substantial prejudice to the insurer. The insurer must be
"reasonable in its demands and diligent in its efforts" to get the
insured to cooperate. Thus the court held that Walton's "mere
failure to appear", in spite of the attorney's frenzied efforts to
secure his appearance at the trial, did not establish that he was
deliberately non-cooperative. The insurer had the burden to es-
tablish that the tort-feasor's failure to attend trial was his delib-
erate act, and the court chose not to find as a matter of law that
the insurer had met the burden. The court preferred to conjecture
that "Walton may have become ill, met with foul play or been
arrested by military police and returned to the Naval Base in
Charleston."96
D. Co -TqumTio BErwEEN IisURERs OF Jom-r ToRT-FFAsoRs
An insurance company found a pregnant phrase in a 1918
South Carolina decision, to the effect that one of two joint tort-
feasors is liable for only half the judgment, and nursed it all the
way to the supreme court in American Fidelity Fire Imurance
CJo. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity 00.97 The injured party
in an automobile collision had recovered a $4,000 judgment
against two joint tort-feasors, one insured and one uninsured.
American, the insurer of the insured tort-feasor, paid $2,000 to
the judgment creditor and brought this declaratory judgment
action seeking a verdict that Hartford, the injured party's liabil-
ity carrier, was liable for the balance. American based its con-
tention that it was liable for only half the judgment on the fol-
lowing language from Brown v. Souther Railway :98 "In such
cases the rule of law is that one of the two joint wrongdoers
96. 166 S.F_2d at 814.
97. 251 S.C. 507, 163 S.E2d 926 (1968).
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can have no contribution from the other. Both the defendants
are liable to pay the recovery in equal parts." 99
But the court was unimpressed by American's find and ruled
the appeal a miscarriage. "The language quoted from the opinion
was not addressed to any issue involved on the appeal and was
not intended to convey the meaning attributed to it by American.
Thus construed, it is athwart the settled law of this jurisdic-
tion .... "10 Rather, the court preferred to deliver a more recent
case, Traveler8 Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,101 for the
proposition that one injured by the negligence of joint tort-fea-
sors may elect the one against whom he will proceed and can pur-
sue the collection of a judgment against one or more of the judg-
ment debtors.
E. FRAUD
"Don't sign it until you read it," is a popular statement of a
valid caveat. But what if you read it, don't understand it, rely
on somebody's explanation of it, and then sign it? The court got
the chance to consider such a rather unique situation in Guy v.
National Old Line Insurance Co.1
0 2
Guy brought an action for fraud and deceit, alleging false rep-
resentations by the insurer upon Guy's purchase of a "Founda-
tion Investment Policy" in 1951. Guy's complaint contended that
the insurer had falsely represented that if the policy were kept
in effect for ten years, then Guy would receive $2,076. The com-
plaint alleged that this representation was false and that it had
induced Guy to take out the policy, and it further asserted that
the truth or falsity of the representation could not be determined
from reading the policy. The policy was not attached to or made
part of the complaint. The insurer demurred to the complaint,
contending that there were no facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action because it appeared on the complaint's face that
the policy contained no mention of the amount allegedly rep-
resented as a benefit of the policy, and that Guy had failed to
take advantage of his opportunity and means to protect his own
interest. The trail court overruled the demurrer, and the insurer
99. Id. at 152, 96 S.E. at 704. The court had found the railroad company
and the city of Spartanburg to be "joint wrongdoers" for imperfectly planning
and constructing a railroad trestle.
100. 251 S.C. 507, 510, 163 S.E.2d 926, 927.
101. 249 S.C. 592, 155 S.E.2d 591 (1967).
102. 164 S.E.2d 905 (S.C. 1968).
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appealed from the order.10 3 Thus the issue on appeal was merely
whether the complaint, without considering the policy, sufficient-
ly stated a cause of action good against a demurrer.
The court began by citing the general rule from Gordon v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. :104
We have consistently followed the rule that ordinarily
one cannot complain of fraud in the misrepresentation
of the content of a written instrument when the truth
could have been ascertained by reading the instrument,
and one entering into a written contract should read it
and avail himself of every reasonable opportunity to un-
derstand its content and meaning.10 5
But the court distinguished Guy from the general rule, for here
it did not appear that the plaintiff failed to read the policy.
Instead the court cited Crosby v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.'10 There the plaintiff had bought and paid premiums on a
policy on a cousin's life, allegedly believing from the insurance
agent's representations that the plaintiff was the named benefic-
iary. She was not in fact the named beneficiary, but plaintiff's
evidence showed that she had been induced by the agent to be-
lieve that a "trick clause" in the policy made her the beneficiary
when, of course, it did not. Plaintiff won a verdict for actual and
punitive damages. Said the court in Guy, in affirming the over-
ruling of the insurer's demurrer:
This case is not directly in point, but it is the only South
Carolina case coming to our attention, where it was al-
leged, as here, that the language of the policy itself was
confusing, and that such was a factor in causing the false
representation to be accepted as true. To that extent, the
decision is persuasive in the instant case.
107
Thus the court concluded that the complaint's allegations of
plaintiff's conduct did not estop Guy from asserting fraud on the
103. The trial judge had considered the policy itself in ruling on the motion,
and since the policy had not been made part of the complaint or the demurrer,
it was error to consider it. The portions of the lower court order dealing
with the contents of the policy were not affirmed.
104. 238 S.C. 438, 120 S.E.2d 509 (1961).
105. 164 S.E2d at 906-07.
106. 161 S.C. 519, 159 S.E. 926 (1931) (overruling of demurrer aff'd), 167
S.C. 255, 166 S.E. 266 (1932).
107. 164 S.E.2d at 908. The court also cites as "of persuasive influence"
Outlaw v. Calhoun Life Ins. Co., 236 S.C. 272, 113 S.E.2d 817 (1960) and
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insurer's part at the inception of the policy. Whether or not
estoppel would operate would depend upon the circumstances of
the case as developed on trial.
F. SURETYSHn AND SUBROGATION
The latest in a series of the complex cases arising out of a job
foreman's diversion into check forging came before the court in
Southb Carolina National Bank v. Lake City State Bank. 10 8
An employee of W. Wesley Singletary & Son, Inc. had drawn
his employer's payroll checks to fictitious payees, forged the en-
dorsements, and cashed the forgeries to a total of $14,879.44. In
the first step of the litigation, Singletary sued Lake City State
Bank for this amount of the bogus checks which the bank had
debited from Singletary's account. Hartford Accident and In-
demnity Co. was Lake City's surety. South Carolina National
Bank was a prior endorser of the checks.
The relevant question on this appeal was whether Lake City's
right of recovery against South Carolina National was to be
diminished by the partial indemnity received by Lake City under
its insurance contract with Hartford. The court decided to
award Lake City full recovery.
In the exercise of its business judgment, with full
knowledge of the recurring risks involved and the pre-
miums to be saved, SCN contracted for forgery insur-
ance with a $25,000.00 deductible clause. It thereby
elected, in order to save the premium differential, to be
a self-insurer against losses up to this figure. No good
reason appears for giving this self-insurer the benefit
of insurance procured by Lake City solely for its own
protection and paid for by it.109
But perhaps the most important part of the court's opinion was
a bit of dicta which sounded a stern caveat as to the strength of
the paid surety defense in South Carolina:
[W]e are not convinced that SON would have a de-
fense against Hartford if the latter had paid full in-
demnity to Lake City and sued as subrogee ....
... [I]nsurers against forgery losses have been allowed
subrogation to the rights of their insureds against for-
108. 251 S.C. 500, 164 S.E.2d 103 (1968).
109. Id. at 504, 164 S.E.2d at 105.
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warding banks or other prior endorsers .... [The court
relied principally for this proposition on Metropolitan
Cas. Ins. Co. v. First Natl Bank, 261 Mich. 450, 246
N.W. 178 (1933); Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia,
15 N.J. 162, 104 A. 2d 288 (1954) ; O'Malley, "Subroga-
tion Against Banks on Forged Checks," 51 CoiNx z L.Q.
441 (1966).]
We have called attention to these authorities princip-
ally because it was assumed by counsel and the court in
SingletaryOA... that the paid surety doctrine, as settled
law, would have defeated a subrogation action by Single-
tary's insurer against Lake City, and because we have
paid lip service to the defense in other cases .... How-
ever, an examination of our decisions discloses that we
have never denied subrogation by applying the paid
surety versus innocent bank criterion and are not com-
mitted to the doctrine. Recognizing that serious chal-
lenges have been leveled against the usefulness and prac-
ticality of the compensated surety defense under modern
banking practices, we observe that the law thereabout is
unsettled in this jurisdiction.110
G. Evnnu'cE
Mention of Insurance - A DeZicate Balance. In Jones v. Mass-
ingale,111 the court found an opportunity to take a substantial
swipe at the long-debated "rule" that the mention of insurance in
a torts claims case should result in a mistrial because of possible
prejudice to the defendant and his liability insurer. In this case,
a typical auto collision tort action where the husband and wife
brought suit for the wife's personal injuries, the principal issue
was the validity of a release that the plaintiffs had executed.
The defendant contended that the issue of the validity of the re-
lease should be tried first and separately from the causes of ac-
tion in the plaintiffs' complaints. Appealing from the trial
court's denial of this motion, the defendant pleaded that a joint
trial of the issues would result in prejudice to him and his
insurer because the jury would thus be made aware of the exist-
109A. W. Wesley Singletary & Son, Inc., v. Lake City State Bank, 243 S.C.
180, 133 S.E.2d 118 (1963).
110. Id. at 505-06, 164 S.E.2d at 105-06. The court cited as paid surety "lip-
service" cases Rivers v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 135 S.C. 107, 133 S.E. 210
(1926), and United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 244 S.C.
436, 137 S.E.2d 582 (1964).
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ence of liability insurance. The appellant's brief cited several
South Carolina rulings to the effect that the mention of insur-
ance to a trial jury is prejudicial error in tort claim litigation. 112
The court stated that any possible prejudice resulting from the
jury's knowledge of the defendant's insurance must be weighed
against the burden resulting from the multiplicity of suits that
would result." 3 The court also considered that today's jury in an
auto collision case can hardly be expected to doubt the existence
of liability insurance coverage:
Today owners of motor vehicles are almost required by
law to procure liability insurance, and there is a popular
belief (though an erroneous one) that liability insur-
ance in this state is actually required. Before a person
(including, of course, jurors) may procure an annual
license plate for his motor vehicle he must prove his
liability coverage or contribute to the uninsured motor-
ists fund. Accordingly, every juror who owns an
automobile is of necessity well aware of the likelihood
of liability insurance coverage."
4
Thus the supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of the
defendant's motion for separate jury trials.115
112. This issue is discussed in Brief for Appellant at 11-19. The most recent
South Carolina case cited in the brief is Crocker v. Weathers, from which is
quoted, "The long-established rule of our decisions is that the fact that a
defendant is protected from liability in an action for damages by insurance
shall not be made known to the jury." 240 S.C. 412, 424, 126 S.E.2d 335,
340-41 (1962). However, in that case the court allowed the verdict to stand
even after the plaintiff's counsel had not only told the jury that there was
insurance in the case, but what the policy limits were. See J. DREHER, A GUIoE
To EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 41 (1967). The most similar case the
appellant could locate was Bowie v. Sorrel, 209 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1953), where
the federal circuit court upheld the trial court in granting a separate trial on
the issue of the validity of a release because if all the issues were tried at one
time with a jury, the fact of the appellant's insurance coverage would inevitably
be made known to the jury.
The plaintiff-respondent found a neat way to skirt the issue. Noting that
the defendant's liability carrier was not a party to the instant proceeding,
the brief asserted that whether or not the insurer would be prejudiced was
immaterial. Brief for Respondent at 10-11.
113. If the defendant's motion were granted, four jury trials would result-
separate jury trials on two issues in each of the two cases.
114. 251 S.C. at 463, 163 S.E.2d at 220. Accord, J. DREHER, A GumE To
EVIDENcE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 40-41 (1967).
115. A federal district court case decided during the survey period, Pre-
ferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greer, 289 F. Supp. 261 (D.S.C. 1968), seemed
to lean the other way. There the court held that the issue of the liability of an
insured under a policy of limited liability should not be tried in an interpleader
action because, inter alia, under South Carolina law the defendant is entitled








The 1969 General Assembly will be remembered more for the
insurance legislation which it saw introduced rather than that
which it passed. Eight acts and one joint resolution dealing with
insurance were ratified during the session, and all were of
practically no significance.
However, a far-ranging proposal was introduced by Senator
Waddell which would substantially revise South Carolina insur-
ance law." 6 The bill was introduced this year to afford the
legislature an opportunity to study its provisions for several
months before it is again presented in 1970. It is certain to be one
of the most controversial bills debated in the 1970 session.
Very briefly, the proposed law would limit an insurer's right
to cancel automobile liability insurance policies to only two con-
ditions, nonpayment of premium or suspension or revocation of
the insured's driver's license. 1"" The bill provides that an insured
may request the state insurance commissioner to review the insur-
er's action in cancelling the policy, and the insurer's failure to
comply with any resulting order from the commissioner could
result in the revocation of the insurer's license. Further, the as-
signed risk statute is revised.
One of the most controversial sections of the bill would pro-
vide for mandatory arbitration proceedings, structured below the
circuit courts, to arbitrate issues in non-real estate disputes where
the amount in controversy is less than $3,000. Another very signi-
ficant provision would enact comparative neligence as the stand-
ard for rendering judgment in auto vehicle accidents and elimi-
nate contributory negligence as a bar to recovery. Finally, the
bill would add another chapter to the South Carolina code to pro-
vide for rating organizations to promote competition in automo-
bile insurance.
CHA MS E. Hna,
116. Calendar No. S. 413, read for the first time June 24, 1969.
117. Legislative concern over insurers' unjustified cancellation of automobile
liability policies was also manifested in a joint resolution, R444, June 18, 1969,
which created a nine-member committee to investigate, inter alia, the com-
plaints of state residents concerning the unjust, unreasonable or unexplained
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